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Gordon: Redefining the Standard

REDEFINING THE STANDARD: WHO CAN BE A PERSON
LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF A CHILD
UNDER THE FAMILY COURT ACT?
Alexsis Gordon*

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
IN RE TRENASIA J. 1
(DECIDED MAY 5, 2015)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Raising a child often involves a shared obligation, if not a
“village.”2 The persons taking on this responsibility may include
parents, significant others of the parents, stepparents, or babysitters.3
Under the New York Family Court Act, children are protected from
abuse or neglect by those who are legally responsible for them.4
While a child’s parents are certainly legally responsible for their own
child (absent adoption or termination of parental rights), more
difficulty lies in determining who else is a “person legally
responsible” (“PLR”) for the child other than the parents.5 Section
1012(g) of the Family Court Act provides that a “[p]erson legally
responsible includes the child’s custodian, guardian [or] any other
person responsible for the child’s care at the relevant time.”6 The
*
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1
32 N.E.3d 378, 383 (N.Y. 2015).
2
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2016), practice commentaries, Merril Sobie
[hereinafter “Merril Sobie”].
3
Id.
4
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2009).
5
Id.
6
Id. at § 1012(g).
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statutory definition for PLR extends to persons who are not related to
the child but are tasked with the care for, and responsibility of, the
child.
While the statute clearly states that a person legally
responsible for the child’s care is a proper respondent, courts have
had trouble interpreting exactly who is a PLR because the definition
may encompass people who are not within the statute’s purview.
Applying the PLR definition, the courts have adopted a
“commonsense approach”;7 however, something less subjective is
needed. What may be common sense to one person is not necessarily
common sense to others. In In re Yolanda D.8 the Court of Appeals
established a test, which weighs several factors to determine whether
an individual is a proper PLR for the care of a child.9 The Court of
Appeals enumerated these factors as a way to “illustrate some of the
salient considerations in making an appropriate [PLR]
determination.”10 However, the courts give too much weight to the
relationship between the respondent and the subject child’s parents,
which is merely one of several factors to be considered in
determining who is a PLR, none of which is outcome determinative.11
This note will examine a recent case before the New York
Court of Appeals, In re Trenasia J.,12 where the court considered the
issue of whether a child’s uncle was a PLR for the child, as defined
by Family Court Act § 1012(g).13 The Court of Appeals in In re
Trenasia J., based on the factors established in In re Yolanda D., held
that the evidence amply supported a finding that the respondent was a
PLR for the child’s care.14 This note will unravel the factors New
York courts consider in making a PLR determination, specifically
focusing on when a non-parent, non-legal guardian can be a PLR for
the care of a child. Part II will discuss the history and background of
section 1012(g). Part III will discuss the relevant facts and the Court
of Appeals discussion in In re Trenasia J. Part IV will focus on
7

Merril Sobie, supra note 1.
In re Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1996).
9
Id. at 1231.
10
Id.
11
Id. The other factors that the court considers are the frequency of the contact, the nature
and extent of the control exercised by the respondent, and the duration of the contact. In re
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d 378, 383 (N.Y. 2015).
12
In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d 377 (N.Y. 2014).
13
Id. at 378.
14
Id.
8
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when a non-parent, non-legal guardian can be a PLR, and which
circumstances constitute temporary versus non-temporary care of a
child for these purposes. It will also discuss the failure of the court in
In re Trenasia J. to apply the factors properly, and why that decision
is problematic for future PLR findings where the court must make a
well-informed determination that rests on the factual record before it.
Finally, this note will conclude with a brief summary.
II.

BACKGROUND

Child abuse and neglect are recognized as serious, ongoing
societal problems and, therefore, are addressed by our legislatures
and courts. The U.S. Department for Health and Human Services
published a Child Maltreatment Report for 2013,15 which presented
national data about child abuse and neglect in the United States
during federal fiscal year 2013.16 Perpetrators of abuse or neglect
who were related to, but not parents of, their victims made up 10.4%
of abuse relationships, and those who were the unmarried partner of
the parent constituted 7.6% of abuse relationships.17 This data
establishes that family members and significant others of parents
account for a large portion of abuse and neglect.18 The largest
perpetrator category was that of biological parents, which accounted
for 88.6% of relationships.19
A child’s biological parent or legal parent is readily
determinable and, clearly, the parent is primarily responsible for the
care of his/her children. Thus, earlier New York laws protecting
children from neglect and abuse focused on a parent, guardian, or
other person living with the child as the primary persons that can be
proper respondents in a Family Court proceeding.20 The 1922 Family
Court Act did include non-parental persons who lived with the child,
encompassing those persons within the statute’s purview.21
However, “a person who lives with the child” is both underinclusive—because it would not encompass a person who is legally
15

CHILDREN’S
BUREAU,
Child
Maltreatment
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2013.pdf.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 66.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Merril Sobie, supra note 1.
21
Id.
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responsible yet does not live with the child—and over-inclusive—
because not every person who lives with a child is a PLR.22
Parental functions are not always performed by parents, and
non-parental caretakers should not be excluded from prosecution
under the statute simply because of their non-parental status.23
Therefore, the 1962 Family Court Act broadened the category of nonparental caretakers who could be prosecuted for neglect or abuse by
adding the language “other person legally responsible” when it
enacted subdivision (g) of Section 1012 in the Family Court Act.24
This catch-all provision ensures that children are protected from
persons who may cause them harm, even if those persons are not
legally or biologically related to the children.
By way of comparison, other states have adopted different
requirements for being a PLR for the care of a child. The statutory
definitions of PLR for a child in other jurisdictions vary.
Nonetheless, language frequently incorporates those taking care of
the child, “exercising control over the child, and adults residing
within the child’s home.”25 In jurisdictions with the language quoted
above, the statutes seek to impose a legal duty on those who are in a
position of taking on parental responsibilities.26 In New Jersey, the
relevant statute defines PLR as “any person who has assumed
responsibility for the care, custody, or control of a child.”27 The New
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Kate Brittle, Note, Child Abuse by Another Name: Why the Child Welfare System Is the
Best Mechanism in Place to Address the Problem of Juvenile Prostitution, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1339, 1357 (2008).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 901(3) (West 2006) (responsible party is “a
person or persons in a position of trust, authority, supervision or control
over a child”); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.68(7)(b) (2006) (responsible
person includes “[a] relative or any other person with whom the child
resides and who assumes care or supervision of the child”); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 600.020(42) (LexisNexis 1999) (“‘Person exercising
custodial control or supervision’ means a person. . .that has assumed the
role and responsibility of a parent or guardian for the child, but that does
not necessarily have legal custody of the child.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 4321-105(g) (West 2007) (“ ‘Custodian’ means any person having the
present care or custody of a child whether such person be a parent or
otherwise.”).
Id.
26
Id. at 1358-59.
27
Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY
(2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.cfm.
23
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Jersey statute also lists examples of parents or guardians, which
include “a teacher, employee, or volunteer of an institution who is
responsible for the child’s welfare, regardless of whether or not the
person is responsible.”28 Similarly, the analogous Arkansas statute
defines persons responsible for the child as:
A parent, guardian, custodian, or foster parent, a
person age 18 or older living in the home with a child,
whether related or unrelated to the child, any person
who is entrusted with the child’s care by a parent,
guardian, custodian, or foster parent, including, but
not limited to: an agent or employee of a public or
private residential home, child care facility, or public
or private school, a significant other of the child’s
parent, or any person legally responsible for the
child’s welfare. The term “significant other” means a
person with whom the parent shares a household or
who has a relationship with the parent that results in
the person acting in loco parentis with respect to the
parent’s child or children, regardless of living
arrangements.29
The Arkansas statute makes explicit who is a PLR for the care
of a child. It defines those persons who are responsible, while also
listing some examples of persons that the Arkansas law would find
responsible for a child. Both the New Jersey statute and the Arkansas
statute leave little room for interpretation. These statutes are more
detailed, developed, and practical than New York’s PLR statute,
which simply states that other PLRs for the care of a child are within
the family court’s jurisdiction.
In New York, the “spirit and purpose” of Section 1012(g),
that parental functions are not always performed by parents, must be
adhered to by our courts in order to further the legislative intent.30
Parenting in a general sense involves caring for a child, and PLRs do
just that. Section 1012(g) was enacted to provide protection to those
children who are abused or neglected by, not only their parents, but
also those non-parents who take on a parental role.31 This catch-all
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id.
Merril Sobie, supra note 1.
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1230.
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provision ensures that children are protected from persons who may
cause them harm, even if those persons are not legally or biologically
related to the children.
III.

IN RE TRENASIA J.

The New York Court of Appeals recently held in In re
Trenasia J. that the evidence presented in the child protective
proceeding before the family court was sufficient to establish that the
child’s uncle was a PLR for the child at the time that the child was
allegedly abused.32 The evidence established that the child was in her
uncle’s home on several occasions, occasionally spent the night at his
home, and saw him at family functions.33 The evidence also
established that the child had a close relationship with her uncle.34
A.

Factual and Procedural Background

In February 2011, the Administration for Children’s Services
(“ACS”) filed child abuse and neglect petitions against Frank J., the
child’s uncle through marriage.35 The petitions alleged that he
“forcefully attempted to have sexual intercourse” with the child while
she was taking a shower36 during an overnight visit at Frank J.’s
home on December 31, 2010.37 Frank J. moved to dismiss the
petition, arguing that the family court did not have jurisdiction
because he was not a proper respondent under the Family Court
Act.38 As previously discussed, a proper respondent under section
1012(a) includes a parent or other PLR for the care of the child who
is alleged to have abused or neglected the child.39 Specifically, Frank
J. argued that he was not a PLR “because he was neither the guardian
nor custodian of the child, and she was never a member of his

32

Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378.
Id. at 380.
34
Id. at 380.
35
Id. at 378. Frank J. is the father of three children (the “J.” children), who were also
named in the court proceeding, and is charged with derivative neglect of his children
stemming from this incident. Id.
36
Id.
37
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378.
38
Id. at 379.
39
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(a) (McKinney 2016).
33
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household.”40 Based on the evidence presented at Frank J.’s hearing,
the Court of Appeals found that there was “record support” for the
family court’s decision and affirmed the finding that Frank J. was a
PLR.41 In evaluating “the frequency and nature of the contact,” and
“the duration of the respondent’s contact with the child,” the Court of
Appeals determined that the record established that the child was
staying at Frank J.’s house for a week preceding the incident.42
Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that the “total contacts
between Frank J. and the child were significant” because of the
repeated times the child spent the night at his home (four), visited his
home (between eight and nine times), and interacted with him at
various family functions.43
The Kings County Family Court denied Frank J.’s motion to
dismiss.44 The court heard testimony from the child’s mother and the
responding police officer and determined that Frank J. was a PLR
within the meaning of section 1012(g).45 Subsequently, at the factfinding hearing, where the child, the responding police officer, and
Frank J. testified, the family court held that Frank J. abused the child
“by committing an act of attempted sexual abuse in the [s]econd
[d]egree.”46 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the
testimony of both the child and the responding officer were factually
equivalent to the allegations of abuse stated in the police report,
which were that Frank J. allegedly attempted to forcefully have
sexual intercourse with the child.47 Frank J. rebutted the allegations
and testified that “the child had become upset when he scolded her
for eating in one of the bedrooms.”48 Nonetheless, the court denied
his motion and found him to be a PLR.
Frank J. appealed to Appellate Division, Second Department,
and the Second Department affirmed the family court decision.49 The
Second Department stated that “[c]ontrary to [Frank J.’s] contention,
the family court correctly found him to be a person legally
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id.
Id at 379.
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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responsible for his niece . . . within the meaning of the Family Court
Act.”50 Frank J. appealed to the Court of Appeals, and his motion for
leave to appeal was granted.51
B.

Court of Appeals Discussion of In re Yolanda D

In In re Yolanda D., the Court of Appeals recognized that
parenting functions are not always performed by a
parent but may be discharged by other persons,
including custodians, guardians and paramours, who
perform caretaking duties commonly associated with
parents. Thus, the common thread running through the
various categories of persons legally responsible for a
child’s care is that these persons serve as the
functional equivalent of parents.52
By making this recognition, the court elaborated on the PLR
provision of section 1012(g) and made clear that, although one may
not be the child’s parent, one may fit into another appropriate
category in which one is performing traditional functions that a
parent would perform.
In In re Yolanda D., the court held that “determining whether
a particular person has acted as the functional equivalent of a parent
is a discretionary, fact-intensive inquiry which will vary according to
the particular circumstances of each case.”53 In re Yolanda D.
addressed whether an uncle, who was named a respondent in a family
court proceeding, was a PLR for his twelve-year-old niece during her
summer visits to his Pennsylvania home.54 The child visited the
respondent six to seven times during the summer of 1991, and three
to four of those visits were overnight stays.55 The record established
that the child visited her uncle during the summer for two weekends a
month.56 The child and her mother lived in New York, and when the
child spent her summers in Pennsylvania, her mother did not travel

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

In re Trenasia J., 966 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013).
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379.
Id. at 381.
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
Id.
Id. at 1232.
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with her.57 The uncle also spent time with the child when he visited
her home in New York.58 The lower court determined that the uncle
was “regularly in the same household as [the child] during the
relevant time, an environment he controlled, and he regarded his
relationship with [the child] as close and familial.”59 Further, he
permitted the child “to stay overnight in his home, [thereby]
provid[ing] shelter, a traditional parental function, in an area
geographically distant from the child’s own household.”60 Because
the uncle’s contacts were substantial (two weekends a month during
the summer), and he took on the role of a parent during the times the
child visited, the court found the uncle to be a PLR and therefore a
proper respondent in a family court proceeding.61
The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. examined at great
length its seminal 1996 decision in In re Yolanda D. Specifically, the
Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. focused on the factors
established in In re Yolanda D. to be considered in a PLR
determination. These factors include: (1) “the frequency and nature
of the contact;” (2) “the nature and extent of the control exercised by
the respondent over the child’s environment;” (3) “the duration of the
respondent’s contact with the child;” and (4) “the respondent’s
relationship to the child’s parent(s).”62
The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. clearly identified
the relevant factors established by the In re Yolanda D. court before
applying them to the case at hand. The Court of Appeals recognized
that, in determining whether the first factor is met, courts should
evaluate the total amount of contact between the respondent and the
child.63 When evaluating the second factor—the nature and extent of
the control exercised by the respondent over the child’s
57

Id.
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1232.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d 377,380 (N.Y. 2014).
63
Id. at 381. With respect to the first factor, courts will find that the more often the
contacts in the months leading up to the incident, including interactions at family functions,
the more likely the respondent will be considered a PLR because the person had a greater
opportunity to provide care to the child, analogous to that of a parent. Id. However, in
conjunction with the frequency and nature of the contact, come the actual responsibilities
that the respondent had for the child’s care, which would be relevant to the second factor. Id.
Absent caretaker responsibilities analogous to that of a parent, a respondent will not be held
a PLR for the care of a child. Id.
58
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environment— courts should consider: (a) the location where the
alleged abuse and/or neglect occurred; (b) who else was present at the
time of the alleged abuse and/or neglect; and (c) the respondent’s
responsibilities for the care of the child.64 In considering the third
factor—the duration of the respondent’s contact with the child-careful attention should be given to the extent of the contact as well
as the frequency and continuance of that contact.65 Lastly, with
respect to the fourth factor—the respondent’s relationship to the
child’s parent—courts should analyze the familial relationship. None
of these factors is dispositive; rather, each should be weighed in
relation to the particular facts and circumstances of each case.66
C.

Court of Appeals Discussion: In re Trenasia J.

The Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the law from In
re Yolanda D. to the facts in In re Trenasia J. when it held that Frank
J. was a PLR under Family Court Act § 1012(g).67 Regarding “the
frequency and nature of the contact,” and “the duration of the
respondent’s contact with the child,” the responding police officer
testified that the child had stayed at Frank J.’s home the week leading
up to the incident.68 The child’s mother also testified that the child
spent time with Frank J. eight or nine times during the year before the
incident, and four of those visits were overnight.69 With respect to
“the nature and extent of the control exercised by the respondent over
the child’s environment,” the incident in question occurred during an
overnight visit at Frank J.’s home while he was the only adult
present.70 According to testimony from the child’s mother, the
child’s biological aunt usually cared for the child when she was at the
aunt’s home.71 When the aunt was not there, then Frank J. was
expected to care for the child.72 The final factor the court discussed
64

Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381.
Id. For example, the court might appropriately consider that a child who goes to her
uncle’s home every day after school, visits him on the weekend, and sees him at family
functions satisfies this factor, although it is not outcome determinative. Id.
66
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381.
67
Id. at 380.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 382.
72
Id.
65
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was the “respondent’s relationship to the child’s parent(s).”73 Frank
J. is the child’s uncle through marriage.74 The Court of Appeals
concluded that there was “record support” for the lower court’s
determination that Frank J. was a PLR under Family Court Act §
1012(g), and therefore the approach was consistent with In re
Yolanda D. 75
Judge Rivera, dissented in In re Trenasia J., stating that the
record was devoid of facts supporting a PLR determination based on
the factors established in In re Yolanda D., and for that reason, chose
not to join the majority.76 Judge Rivera considered the record
inadequate to make a proper determination as to Frank J.’s status as a
PLR under the statute because there was no evidence regarding the
nature and duration of his caretaker responsibilities, and the Family
Court relied excessively on the familial relationship.77 The purpose
of the inquiry into the factual record in a section 1012(g) PLR
assessment is to determine the factors set forth in In re Yolanda D.78
However, according to Judge Rivera, the amount of contact that
Frank J. had with the child was not clearly established, and his
caretaking responsibilities were not specific or definite, as required
and essential to a section 1012(g) analysis.79
IV.

DETERMINING WHEN A NON-PARENT, NON-LEGAL
GUARDIAN IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF A
CHILD IN A CIVIL CHILD ABUSE CASE

The following section will broadly diagram the courts’
interpretation of those persons who would, and those who would not
be considered PLRs under New York’s Family Court Act, and the
evolution of that interpretation as a result of the In re Trenasia J.,
decision. It will also examine what is now considered “temporary” or
“fleeting care” of a child for the purpose of being named a respondent
in a family court proceeding. The Family Court Act defines PLR in a
family court proceeding but, because the determination is
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 379.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 380.
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381-82.
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discretionary, and rests on a fact-intensive inquiry, varying
interpretations exist.80
A.

There is a Fine Line Between Persons Who Are
Legally Responsible for a Child and Persons Who
Are Not Legally Responsible

As previously stated, the respondent in a civil proceeding in
family court who is accused of abuse or neglect of a child must be a
PLR for that child.81 The Family Court Act Section 1012(a) defines
respondent to “include[] any parent or other person legally
responsible for a child’s care who is alleged to have abused or
neglected such child.”82 When a court is deciding whether a
respondent is a PLR, there are no predetermined statutory answers
because of the fact-specific nature of a PLR finding.83 Courts
determine who is a PLR and the inquiry depends on the facts in the
record. Thus, court findings can differ from one another.
A child’s parent can be determined with ease, and the statute
clearly encompasses those persons; however, determining whether a
non-parent is a PLR for a child’s care is more complicated. Section
1012(g) of the Act states:
‘Person legally responsible’ includes the child’s
custodian, guardian, [or] any other person responsible
for the child’s care at the relevant time. Custodian may
include any person continually or at regular intervals
found in the same household as the child when the
conduct of such person causes or contributes to the
abuse or neglect of the child.84
A person who is found to be a PLR will, in essence, resemble a
parent in many ways. Although a PLR may not be a legal or
biological “parent,” the PLR’s actions and conduct may be analogous
to those of a parent. For example, the Third Department places a
strong emphasis on the fact that, for all intents and purposes, the
respondent acts as a parent to the subject child by performing

80
81
82
83
84

N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g) (McKinney 2016).
Id. at § 1012(a).
Id.
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 380.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g) (McKinney 2016).
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parental functions.85 By staying overnight in the child’s home, going
grocery shopping, disciplining the child, cooking meals, and buying
gifts, the respondent is functionally the same as a parent.86
In In re Mikayla U.,87 the respondent was the mother’s live-in
boyfriend who performed parental functions, and the Third
Department held that he was a PLR for the children’s care.88 The
record showed that he “was the functional equivalent of a parent in a
familial or household setting” because he frequently put the children
to bed, stayed overnight at the children’s home, talked with the
children, took them to his house where they stayed overnight, and
one of the children considered him to be a father figure.89 This
decision was consistent with the court’s decision in In re Yolanda D.
because both respondents were responsible for many aspects of the
child’s care and took on those responsibilities in a familial setting,
whether in the absence of the child’s parent as in In re Yolanda D. or
with the mother’s occasional presence as in In re Mikayla U.90
In In re Nicole SS.,91 the Third Department held similarly to
its decision in Mikayla U.: that the mother’s live-in boyfriend, who
was not the biological father of the children, was a PLR for the
children’s care, because he acted as a parent to the children by
performing parental functions.92 The respondent lived with the
children for roughly five years, during which time he performed
parental functions such as going grocery shopping, providing gifts to
the children, disciplining the children, and eating family meals with
the children.93 The court found that based on the respondent’s
regular presence in the children’s household, and his parental
relationship with them, he was a proper respondent under section
1012(g) and subject to jurisdiction in the Family Court of Chemung
County.94

85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

In re Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d 145,146 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999).
Id.
699 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146.
Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
In re Nicole SS., 745 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2002).
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
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By contrast, the Third Department in In re Faith GG., which
predates In re Yolanda D.,95 held that the respondent, the mother’s
fiancé, was not a PLR for the subject child under section 1012(g)
because he maintained a separate residence and did not come into
contact with the child very much. Respondent continued to live
separately from the subject child and the mother and only saw the
child periodically, such as when he was asked to babysit or when he
occasionally stayed overnight once or twice a month.96 The term
“any person” was interpreted broadly and had been construed to
include “persons acting in loco parentis97 or as the functional
equivalent of a parent in a household setting.”98 On its face, an
analysis of whether a person is acting in loco parentis resembles a
determination of whether a person is the functional equivalent of a
parent.99 However, an independent analysis must be done under each
scenario.100 A person deemed to be the functional equivalent of a
parent need not intentionally assume responsibility for the care of a
child and can temporarily provide care and still be the functional
equivalent of a parent.101
The difference between the two
determinations is that a person acting in loco parentis intends to be
legally responsible for the care of a child on a permanent basis, but
the functional equivalent of a parent temporarily cares for a child
with no intent to do so permanently.102
In In re Yolanda D., the court interpreted section 1012(g)
broadly, by holding that the definition of PLR applies to those
persons acting in loco parentis as well as those persons who are the
functional equivalent of a parent when the care given coincides with
that of a parent and occurs in a household setting.103 The uncle in In
re Yolanda D. sought to confine the catch-all provision in the statute,
“any other person responsible for the child’s care at the relevant
95

This decision predates Yolanda D. Therefore, the factors established in that case no
longer apply. In re Faith GG., 578 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1992).
96
Faith GG., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
97
Legal Encyclopedia, Cornell Encyclopedia Legal Information Institute, Definition of
Loco
Parentis
(last
visited
Feb.
14,
2017),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/in_loco_parentis. Loco Parentis is Latin for “in the place
of a parent.” Id.
98
Faith GG., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
99
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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time,” to either those persons who assume a parental role while also
continuously being in the child’s home or to persons acting in loco
parentis.104 The Court of Appeals in In re Yolanda D. rejected that
argument and determined that the “narrow interpretation” imposed by
the uncle would in effect be the definition of “custodian” under the
statute.105 The statute defines a custodian as “any person continually
or at regular intervals found in the same household as the child when
the conduct of such person causes or contributes to the abuse or
neglect of the child.”106 Therefore, the uncle’s proposed interpretation
in In re Yolanda D. would make a PLR and a custodian the same
person under the law.107 In addition, that interpretation of the statute
would serve as a restriction applying to those who are continually in
the same household of the child, but the statute is meant to be more
expansive and include those persons who do not fit within a
particular category but nonetheless are within section 1012(g)’s
purview.108 The Court of Appeals did not want to limit the scope of
section 1012(g) and instead determined that the care must be
comparable to that of a parent and occur in a household setting.109
The Third Department, in other decisions since In re Faith GG, still
centered on whether the respondent stands in loco parentis or acts as
the functional equivalent of a parent in a familial setting.110 The
focus on a respondent standing in loco parentis is not necessary to a
proper PLR finding as discussed in In re Yolanda D., and the proper
inquiry is whether the respondent is the functional equivalent of a
parent and therefore a PLR.111
B.

How Courts Weigh “Temporary Care,” “NonTemporary Care,” and “Relevant Times”

The Court of Appeals in In re Yolanda D. held that a person
who temporarily cares for a child would be subject to a family court
104

Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1230.
Id.
106
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g) (McKinney 2016).
107
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1230.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
In re Marta B., 650 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1996) (stating that §
1012(g) “encompasses those acting in loco parentis or as the functional equivalent of a
parent” and is intended to be narrowly interpreted to refer to both.).
111
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231.
105
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proceeding as a respondent if he or she acted as the functional
equivalent of a parent.112 In determining whether a respondent is the
functional equivalent of a parent and therefore a PLR, New York
courts examine the actual care given regardless of whether the
respondent is permanently or temporarily caring for the child.113
When the respondent acts as the functional equivalent of a parent, he
is a PLR and can be subject to a family court proceeding.114 With
respect to temporary or fleeting care, the Court of Appeals in In re
Yolanda held that persons such as teachers, babysitters, and
supervisors of play-dates assume “fleeting” or “temporary” care of a
child and do not fit the statutory definition of PLR under Family
Court Act 1012(g).115
A babysitter is not a PLR because his/her job is to temporarily
care for the child until the parent returns but the parent does not
relinquish control to the babysitter.116 The Court of Appeals in In re
Yolanda examined the child’s dwelling during the incidents of
abuse/neglect as an important factor establishing temporary care.117
Specifically, the following facts related to dwelling supported the
finding that the uncle was a PLR for the child’s care: (1) the child
visited every other week in the summer; (2) the visits were planned to
allow for the uncle to spend time with the child without her mother;
and (3) the child was in a location remote from her domicile.118 The
uncle cared for the child during a specific time period, but the care he
gave was only temporary because he did not live with the child in her
place of domicile. Unlike a babysitter, his responsibilities did not end
when the night was over, but persisted until the child left his control
and returned to her place of domicile in New York with her mother.
Therefore, for the period that the child went to visit him in
Pennsylvania, his care was analogous to that of a parent, and the
court deemed him a PLR. The uncle intended to support and care for
112

Id.
Id. “[F]or example, a paramour may be subject to child protective proceedings as a
respondent even if the paramour has no intention of caring for the child on a permanent
basis.” Id.
114
Id.
115
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231.
116
Oral Argument Transcript, Court of Appeals of the State of New York, Oral Argument
In
the
Matter
of
Trenasia
J.
(February
11,
2015),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/arguments/2015/Feb15/Transcripts/021115-30-OralArgument-Transcript.pdf [hereinafter “Oral Argument Transcript”].
117
Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1232.
118
Id.
113
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his niece for the weeks that she visited him, essentially taking the
child’s mother’s place and acting as the functional equivalent of a
parent during that time period.119
Likewise, in In re Leticia TP.,120 the Kings County Family
Court found that a grandfather’s presence in the child’s home in and
of itself was not enough to establish a PLR finding, but other factors
indicated that he was indeed a PLR.121 The respondent, the biological
grandfather of the subject child, asserted that his presence in the
home, with nothing more, was insufficient to establish he was a
PLR.122 The court did not disagree with this assertion, but found that
there were numerous factors, in addition to his presence in the home,
that indicated the respondent was a PLR. Namely, the court
determined that the respondent: (1) exercised significant control over
the environment of the subject children; (2) lived in the respondent’s
apartment with their mother; (3) cooked and ate meals with the
children; (4) disciplined the children; and (5) engaged in other
caretaker responsibilities equivalent to those of a parent.123 Also,
during the alleged incident, the respondent was the only person
responsible for the subject child.124 The respondent’s familial
relationship with, the nature and extent of his control over, as well as
his responsibilities for the children were so significant that the court
determined that the care was not temporary, and the respondent was a
PLR.125
Last, in In re Anthony YY,126 the Third Department held that
the respondent great-grandmother was not a PLR because, although
she was a part of the subject child’s household, she did not act in loco
parentis, nor was she the functional equivalent of a parent.127 The
record was devoid of the extent of the respondent’s care for the child
and established that she babysat on two occasions, but there was no
proof that she acted in a “parental role” during those two
occasions.128 Therefore, the Third Department likened her acts to the
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
In re Leticia TP., 23 Misc. 3d 1111(A) (2008).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Leticia TP., 23 Misc. 3d at *1.
In re Anthony YY., 608 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994).
Id. at 581.
Id.
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temporary care of a babysitter.129 Because a fine line distinguishes a
person who is a PLR and one who is not, the exact caretaking
responsibilities of the alleged PLR are significant. Furthermore,
because courts have immense discretion, holdings are inconsistent.
V.

A RESPONSIBLE PERSON SHOULD NOT QUALIFY AS A PLR
UNDER THE STATUTE ABSENT FACTS SURROUNDING THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THEIR CARETAKING
RESPONSIBILITIES ESTABLISHING THAT HE PERFORMED
PARENTAL FUNCTIONS

In In re Trenasia J., the Court of Appeals determined that
Frank J. was a PLR for the child, when really he was just a
responsible person.130 The determination that Frank J. was a PLR
should have rested on more facts regarding the nature and extent of
Frank J.’s caretaker responsibilities, and less consideration should
have been afforded to the familial relationship. Frank J. did not need
to have a familial relationship with his niece in order to be a PLR
because this relationship is merely one factor among many that the
court considers in making a PLR determination. The record was
devoid of facts suggesting that Frank J. had parental responsibilities
for the child and how often he was looking after the child. Although
he may have been in the child’s presence at family functions and
when she visited him, the record does not indicate that he had any
parental responsibilities for her because caring for the child was the
aunt’s responsibility. Thus, the record was insufficient to establish
that Frank J. was a PLR under the Family Court Act.
The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. focused on three
attenuated facts to support its PLR determination: the familial
relationship between Frank J. and the child, the number of visits that
the child had with Frank J., and what allegedly occurred during the
incident in question. Considering these facts together, the Court of
Appeals assumed that similar interactions occurred between the child
and Frank J. on other visits.131 However, the only direct testimony
came from the child’s mother, who testified that her sister cared for
the child and Frank J. cared for the child when her sister was not

129
130
131

Id.
In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378; Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 115.
In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378.
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there.132 The mother also testified to the amount of contact her child
had with Frank J.133 None of the facts set forth above, even taken
together, established that Frank J. was a PLR and proper respondent.
Frank J.’s relationship with the child in In re Trenasia J. was
not parallel to the uncle’s relationship with the child in In re Yolanda
D.; rather, it was analogous to a person who merely assumes
temporary care of a child.134 Frank J. had no intention of caring for
the child at all.135
Without additional facts on the record, a
determination that a respondent is the functional equivalent of a
parent cannot simply rest on the respondent’s watching the child on
one occasion. The only evidence in the record that demonstrated
contact between Frank J. and the child was the incident that resulted
in the court proceeding.136 Hence, Frank J.’s care is akin to that of a
temporary caregiver or babysitter. He saw the child between eight
and nine times the entire year, he had no intention of caring for the
child, and there were no additional facts indicating he was
responsible for the child.137 The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia
J. placed undue significance on the incident in question, whereas in
In re Yolanda D., In re Mikayla U., and In re Nicole SS., the courts
focused primarily on the frequency and duration of the contact
between the respondent and the child and looked at the alleged abuse
and neglect over a period of time and not from one isolated
incident.138
The Court of Appeals distinguished Frank J. from a babysitter
by emphasizing his familial relationship with the child. The Court of
Appeals explained that the relationship that Frank J. had to the child
was through marriage.139 Although there is a family tie between the
child and Frank J.—which would not exist if Frank J. were merely a
babysitter and unrelated to the child—this tie is not enough to
establish that he is a PLR. A babysitter is paid to come and go and is
employed for a specified period of time. When a parent or guardian
hires a babysitter, the parent does not relinquish his/her parental
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 379.
In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 380.
Id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 380-81.
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authority to the babysitter. Likewise, in In re Trenasia J., the child’s
mother did not relinquish her authority to Frank J. Although Frank J.
was related to the child, this alone should not be outcome
determinative, because there are other Yolanda factors to be weighed.
A proper determination of whether a respondent’s actions are
analogous to parenting, and whether he/she should be considered a
respondent in a child protective proceeding, requires “a welldeveloped factual record of the nature and extent of the respondent’s
caretaker responsibilities.”140 Indeed, living with the child, taking on
the role of a parent, disciplining a child, and being a constant
overnight visitor in the child’s home, are all acts that lead courts to
determine that the respondent is a PLR.141 Yet, in In re Trenasia J.,
Frank J. merely cared for the child by “default”142 because it was
primarily the aunt’s responsibility to care for the child.143 The record
is devoid of facts describing Frank J.’s responsibilities when he cared
for the child, or how frequently he was solely in charge of the child
(factoring in overnight visits) during the aunt’s absence.144 Since a
PLR determination is fact-specific, the frequency and nature of Frank
J.’s contact with the child in the aunt’s absence were not established,
yet this information is critical in a PLR analysis. Therefore, in this
circumstance, the record was insufficient to make a determination
that the respondent was a PLR.
Judge Rivera’s dissenting opinion in In re Trenasia J. is more
compelling than the majority opinion because, as in Yolanda, her
opinion is based upon a review of Frank J.’s actual caretaker
responsibilities.145 It is clear that The Court of Appeals did not
follow the precedent set in In re Yolanda, which required the court to
look at the factors and make a determination based on a welldeveloped factual record of the caretaking responsibilities of the
PLR. The dissent argued that the record in this case lacked evidence
as to Frank J.’s specific caretaker responsibilities and, therefore, his
care was akin to that of a babysitter, and not a PLR.146 To be precise,
Judge Rivera stated that the record was “vague” regarding Frank J.’s
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d at 146; Nichole SS., 745 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 383.
Id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 382 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
Id.
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caretaker responsibilities for the child, and it could not be established
that Frank J. acted as the functional equivalent of a parent.147 The
dissent further stated that “the majority’s analysis fails to consider
Frank J.’s actual responsibilities for the child’s care during any of the
visits to the home, or the nature of the interactions during the times
when they are supposedly in contact.”148 Unlike the majority, Judge
Rivera emphasized that all of these factors, and not just one, are
indispensable and must be considered in a PLR finding pursuant to
section 1012(g).149 Judge Rivera continued, “[o]f course, it is simply
not possible to assess the relevant facts because the record here is
best characterized by its sheer vagueness regarding the contacts and
Frank J.’s role.”150 As Judge Rivera recognized, the record lacked
important details essential to determining whether Frank J. was the
functional equivalent of a parent and therefore a PLR for the child.151
Even if the underlying incident could be proven, it could have been
an isolated incident when Frank J. was left alone with the child.
Therefore, Frank J. “did not have the type of control and
responsibility for the child that was crucial to the PLR finding in In
re Yolanda D.”152
Without a well-developed factual record of the caretaker
responsibilities and parental role that the respondent has for the child,
a finding that the respondent is a PLR is subjective because what one
may think qualifies as caretaking, another may not. The courts in In
re Leticia TP and Matter of Anthony YY both indicated that the
presence of the respondent in the child’s household was not
enough.153 As previously stated, the purpose of section 1012(g) is to
bring within reach those persons who are legally responsible for the
care of the child, not just responsible persons. Persons who are
members of a child’s household are not, by default, a PLR simply
because they live under the same roof as that child. In order to be
subject to the statute, the person needs to exemplify those salient
responsibilities articulated in Yolanda.

147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 382 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381.
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 383 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
See supra, section III-B.
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The Kings County Family Court, in finding that Frank J. was
a PLR, placed “undue significance” on the uncle/niece relationship
between Frank J. and the child.154 The familial relationship alone
does not determine whether someone is a PLR. Persons not legally
related, but who perform caretaking responsibilities, are still within
the statute’s reach, as shown in In re Mikayla U.,155 and In re Nichole
SS.156 The child’s relationship to the respondent is but one factor the
court should consider in determining whether the respondent is a
PLR.157 The statutory intent of section 1012(g) was to include those
individuals who do not have a familial relationship with the child yet
still provide care for the child.158 After all, it takes a “village” to raise
a child,159 and the legislature which enacted section 1012(g)
recognized that parenting functions are not always performed by a
parent but may be discharged by other persons.160 The Court of
Appeals should have identified additional factors before concluding
that Frank J. was a PLR. For instance, if Frank J. had cared for the
child on several occasions throughout the year, including overnight
visits, where he had taken on the role of a parent, by doing homework
with the child, feeding the child, and providing regular discipline to
the child,161 Frank J. would clearly be a PLR.
Based on the facts in the record, Frank J. was a responsible
person, not a PLR. Although Frank J. did have a relationship with
the child’s parent, this alone, with no other factors, was not enough to
render him a PLR. Absent the familial relationship, Frank J still
could have been a PLR because the statute encompasses those who
are not related to the child and familial relationship is but one factor.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. was too quick to
jump to the conclusion that Frank J. was a PLR for the child. This
decision is of concern because of its binding implications on the
154

Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381.
Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d at 146
156
Nichole SS., 745 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
157
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381.
158
Id.
159
Merril Sobie, supra note 1.
160
Id.
161
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379. Frank J. alleged that the child was upset with him
because he scolded her for eating in the bedroom. Id.
155
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lower courts. In re Trenasia J. sets a lower threshold, and does not
follow In re Yolanda, thereby creating a new path for lower courts.
This new path has a chilling effect, allowing courts to make
determinations based on little or no evidence of caretaking
responsibilities.
Determining whether an individual is a PLR as defined by the
Family Court Act is a discretionary, fact-intensive inquiry, and the
Court of Appeals in In re Yolanda D. established clear factors for this
determination. No one factor is dispositive. However, a thorough
factual record is needed in regard to the personal relationships
between the child and the respondent, the interactions between the
respondent and the child, as well as the nature and extent of the
parental duties tackled by nonparents. The Family Court Act was
enacted to protect children from abuse and neglect from the hands of
those who care for them.162 When a court focuses on just one factor,
in the absence of any evidence regarding the other factors, its
determination has the effect of making a single factor dispositive.
The factual record must speak to more of the factors established in In
re Yolanda D. Although all factors do not need to be established,
there needs to be more than just one, as in the familial relationship in
In re Trenasia J.
Essentially, the Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. placed
too much emphasis on the uncle/niece relationship between the child
and Frank J. This relationship was of little significance because the
Family Court Act reaches beyond those who are related to a child,
and includes other “persons responsible” for the care of a child.
While Frank J. was a responsible person, the court should not have
determined he was a PLR because he was merely in charge by
default. Moreover, no facts in the record spoke to the responsibilities
he had for the child, the extent of control exercised by him, or the
duration of the contact he had with the child. Considering the limited
facts in the record, Frank J.’s care of the child, at best, was analogous
to that of a babysitter.
While New York’s statute is not crystal clear, it is the courts’
responsibility to interpret section 1012(g) and apply it as consistently
as possible. The problem lies with the statute’s implementation, not
necessarily with its language. There needs to be more uniformity in
determining who is a PLR, and who is not, in order to provide
162

Merril Sobie, supra note 1.
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concrete precedent that courts can rely on in their determinations.
The statute is all encompassing by including the catchall provision
for a PLR; however, what it encompasses is unclear and elusive. As
in Yolanda, the details of the specific encounters, along with the
caretaking responsibilities of the PLR, should be described and
outlined in the record, enabling each court to make a consistent
determination.
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